Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry by Dargaud, Emilie
Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated
product industry
Emilie Dargaud
To cite this version:
Emilie Dargaud. Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry.
Working Paper du GATE 2005-07. 2005. <halshs-00180041>
HAL Id: halshs-00180041
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00180041
Submitted on 17 Oct 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL - WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
W.P. 05-07 
  
Monopolization through acquisitions in a 
differentiated product industry 
 
 
 
Emilie Dargaud 
 
 
 
 
 
Juin 2005 
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
93 chemin des Mouilles – 69130 Écully – France 
B.P. 167 – 69131 Écully Cedex 
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
Messagerie électronique gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Serveur Web : www.gate.cnrs.fr 
 
Monopolization through acquisitions in a
differentiated product industry
DARGAUD Emilie∗
GATE†
University Lyon 2
Abstract. This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price
competition with horizontal product differentiation. In contrast to the re-
sults obtained by Kamien and Zang (1990), we show that merged equilibria
can appear in this game. Moreover monopolization of the industry occurs
with a high number of firms.
Keywords: Mergers; Oligopoly; Cooperative game
JEL classification: L10; L11; L20
∗Tel.: +33(0)472866037 ; fax: +33(0)472866090 ; e-mail: dargaud@gate.cnrs.fr
†Groupe d’Analyse et de The´orie Economique, UMR 5824 du CNRS -93, chemin des
mouilles, 69130 Ecully- France
1
1 Introduction
In a famous paper, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) have reported that
in a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products, linear demand and cost
functions, a merger is beneficial for participating firms if more than 80 per
cent of all firms merge. It is because outsiders are more beneficial than the
firms participating to the merger, the ”insiders”. Since production costs are
linear, any coalition of firms is indifferent with respect to the way of splitting
its total production among the members of the coalition, so, every coalition
of firms behaves as if it were a single firm.
Perry and Porter (1985) but also Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have chal-
lenged the view that a merged firm is no larger than any of the constituent
firms. These studies introduce the existence of some crucial assets that are
in limited supply in order to capture the notion that some firms are larger
than others in a homogeneous product industry. This assumption implies
rising marginal cost of output production and, consequently, internal cost
savings from mergers could make a merger profitable.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) have found an opposite result in the case
of price competition with differentiated products where a merger is always
beneficial for the insiders.
Kamien and Zang (1990) have explored the possibility of endogenous
monopolization of a homogeneous good Cournot oligopoly through one firm’s
acquisition of the others. They adopt two different approaches : firstly, an
analysis of a centralized game : an owner who acquired several firms behaves
as one entity (as in SSR, 1983). Secondly, they explore the possibility for an
owner, possessing several firms, to choose the optimal number of active firms,
each of them competing with each other : it is the decentralized game. More
precisely, in this kind of game, they emphasize that an owner, possessing
several firms, chooses to operate more than one firm. They disclose that, for
the two kinds of game, monopolization can only occur in industries composed
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ex-ante of a small number of firms. Moreover, in the centralized game (SSR
context (1983)) with a large number of firms, merged equilibria (that means
the number of active firms is fewer than the initial number of firms) are
non-existent which reinforce the SSR’s results (1983).
In Kamien and Zang (1993), a sequential noncooperative game in which
the centralized game is played over and over is considered. They show that
monopolization of the industry is impossible if the initial number of firms is
relatively high.
A more recent literature takes into account strategic delegation (Gonzalez-
Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) or Ziss (2001)) to study merger profitabil-
ity. What differs to the decentralized game in Kamien and Zang (1990)
is the two types of competition : in the production and in the remuner-
ation of managers. The delegation increases competition between entities
inside the firm. Consequently, the incentives to merge and the profitability
of merger, under delegation, are considerably increased with respect to the
setting without delegation. Ziss (2001) argues that a merger will result in
the merged entity operating only one firm.
Commitment through delegation may be limited by the possibility to
renegotiate delegation contract in the absence of a strong enforcing institu-
tional setting avoiding false disclosure and private renegotiation. Precom-
mitment effects seem to rest on the crucial assumption that contracts, once
publicly disclosed, cannot be secretly renegotiated. But this is at odds with
reality: whether legally enforceable or of a more implicit nature, actual con-
tracts can almost always be renegotiated if both parties agree (Caillaud,
Jullien and Picard, 1995). In the same way, in the decentralized game of
Kamien and Zang (1990), internal competition is not credible because if con-
tracts were renegotiable ex-post, firms may act cooperatively. In our model,
we consider that firms belonging to the same owner play in a cooperative
way.
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Our purpose is to analyse the incentives to merge in a context of price
competition with horizontal product differentiation. As in Kamien and Zang
(1990), a three-stage game is considered.
We study merger profitability by assuming that an owner of several firms
chooses the number of firms he lets active. This optimal number is endoge-
nously determined to maximize merger profit. The number of active firms
plays a major role : since products are horizontally differentiated, demand
increases with the number of active firms so a merger can gain market shares,
but equilibrium price is lower. Active firms create internal competition but
reinforces competition with the other firms in a same time.
We consider market structure with a high number of firms. We show
that merged equilibria can appear in this game. Moreover monopolization
of the industry occurs with this high number of firms. This is in contrast
to the results obtained by Kamien and Zang (1990) who demonstrated that
no merged equilibrium exists in a centralized game and that monopolization
never occurs for a sufficiently large number of firms in their games (neither
centralized nor decentralized).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Char-
acterizations of equilibrium are provided in section 3. Concluding remarks
follow. Proofs of results appear in the appendix.
2 The model
We consider the following utility function derived from Ha¨ckner (2000) :
U(q, I) =
n∑
i=1
qi −
1
2


n∑
i=1
q2i + 2γ
∑
i6=j
(qiqj)

+ I (1)
The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] measures the substitutability between the prod-
ucts. Utility is quadratic in the consumption of the n horizontally differ-
entiated products and linear in the consumption of others goods: I, which
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price is normalized to one.
Demand function is :
qi(pi, pj , n) =
1
1 + γ(n− 1)

1− 1 + γ(n− 2)
1− γ
pi +
γ
1− γ
∑
j 6=i
pj

 (2)
We assume that entry into the industry is difficult and that each producer
operates at a constant and identical marginal and average cost of c. Without
loss of generality, we assume that c = 0. All the relevant variables and
strategies available to the firms are common knowledge.
We posit an initial industry consisting of n = 16 identical and indepen-
dent firms.
Let us now turn to the formal description of our three-stage game.
• Stage 1 : bidding stage.
One or two firms make offers simultaneously to other firms and each
firm sets a ceasing price for its own firm. Each shareholder computes
his willingness to pay for one, two, three or more firms.
Let Kj be the number of firms owned by a merger Mj and Z the num-
ber of outsiders which have not been bought.
A firm ′j′ is sold to ′i′ if the bid of ′i′ is not smaller than the asking
price and if it is the highest bid for this firm, it is sold to the willing-
ness to pay of the buyer.
The allocation of firm ′i′ is independent of the asking prices and bids
received by every other firm. In the presence of tie, firm ′i′ is not sold.
A market structure is a Nash equilibrium in this subgame if no firm is
able to purchase one or several firms and the others accept.
We authorize successive bidding by one or two firms until the equilib-
rium is reached.
• Stage 2: merger stage.
Each owner decides the number of his active firms.
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Let kj (0≤kj≤Kj) be the number of active firms owned by Mj . A
SPNE (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) in an acquisition game is
said to be merged if the number of firms operated by all owners is fewer
than the initial number of firms.
• Stage 3: competition stage.
Firms belonging to the same owner act cooperatively amongst one
another but face competition with each other. The active firms in
mergers and the outside firms compete in price.
We characterize pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
3 Analysis of equilibria
This section characterizes the set of equilibria.
proposition 1. At equilibrium, monopolization of the industry occurs.
We prove this result and exhibit two trajectories which conduct to the
monopolization equilibrium. The first allows two firms to make bids on the
others. The second allows only one firm to bid on the others.
3.1 Indirect monopolization
In this section, we consider the case where two mergers denoted M1 and M2
can buy firms. Each of them operates respectively k1 and k2 units. There
are Z outside firms.
3.1.1 Equilibrium prices
M1, M2 and the outside firms simultaneously choose the price of each of
their firm seeking to maximize their profit.
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lemma 1. Equilibrium prices of the two mergers (p∗1 and p
∗
2) and the out-
siders (p∗) are given by:


p∗1=
(1−γ)(2+2(Z−1)γ+2γk1+γk2)(2+(2Z−3)γ+2γ(k1+k2))
A
p∗2=
(1−γ)(2+(2Z−3)γ+2γ(k1+k2))(2+2(Z−1)γ+γ(k1+2k2))
A
p∗= (1−γ)(2+2(Z−1)γ+2γk1+γk2)(2+2(Z−1)γ+γ(k1+2k2))
A
with
A = 2γ2k21(4− 4γ + 3Zγ + 3γk2) + 2(1 + (Z − 1)γ + γk2)(2(2 + (Z − 3)γ)(1 +
(Z − 1)γ) + γ(4− 4γ + 3Zγ)k2) + γk1(2(8 + 5(Z − 2)γ)(1 + (Z − 1)γ) + γk2(22−
25γ + 17Zγ + 6γk2)).
We check that A > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equilibrium profit of the merger M1 is given by:
piM1 =
1
(1 + γ(k1 + k2 + Z − 1))A2
(1− γ)k1(1 + (Z − 1)γ + γk2)
(2 + 2(Z − 1)γ + 2γk1 + γk2)
2(2 + (2Z − 3)γ + 2γ(k1 + k2))
2 (3)
The expression for merger M2 is symmetric.
3.1.2 Merger phase
We now determine if an owner of several firms will choose to close some of
them or to keep all of them active.
proposition 2.
• If Z≥2 then merged equilibria can not occur in this game.
• If Z<2 the game can result in merged equilibria depending on the prod-
ucts substitutability. Merged equilibria can appear when the products
are not too much differentiated.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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The existence of merged equilibria depends on the number of outsiders.
Precisely, the presence of outsiders increases the competitive pressure, so
when the number of outsiders is high enough (Z ≥ 2), an owner of several
firms will not close some of them to maintain its market power.
In the following of the paper, we assume γ = 0.9 in order to study all the
different cases (merged or unmerged equilibria).
The objective now is to analyse if the number of firms owned by the
mergers influences the number of firms they will let active.
Let us define the reaction function of the merger M1 : k
∗
1(k2).
lemma 2. The reaction function of the merger M1 is:
k∗
1
(k2, Z) =


K1 if Z > 1, ∀k2
f(k2) < K1 if Z = 1 and k2 ≥ 8
K1 if Z = 1 and k2 < 8
g(k2) if Z = 0
The proof is obtained by numerical simulations. Appendix C gives the
exact values of functions f and g as well as values of profit functions.
The reaction function of the merger K2 is a symmetrical function of
k∗1(k2).
We observe that k∗1(k2) is a decreasing function, so k1 and k2 are strategic
substitutes.
3.1.3 Bidding stage
We suppose initially that each of the two shareholders M1 and M2 owns one
firm and can not sell it; only the outside firms can be sold but only in their
entirety. Each of the two shareholders simultaneously sets a vector of bids
facing the number of firms owned by the other, that means, facing K2 firms,
the first shareholder has to decide how many firms to purchase.
After a deal, each shareholder owns one or more firms (Kj ∈ (1, 15), Z ∈
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(0, 14)).
Transactions occur in this acquisition stage until no additional purchase
by one of the first two firms can be realized. The equilibrium condition is
then defined by :
WTPMi(K1,K2, Z) < WTS
Mi
out(K1,K2, Z),∀i = 1, 2.
WTPMi(K1,K2, Z) is the maximum price (Willingness To Pay) Mi is
willing to pay for buying Ki − 1 firms, facing the other merger owning Kj
firms. It is defined by :
WTPMi(Ki,Kj , Z) = piMi(Ki,Kj , Z)− piMi(1,Kj , Z +Ki − 1) (4)
WTSMiout(K1,K2, Z) ∀i = 1, 2 is the total minimum selling price (Will-
ingness To Sell) of outsiders towards the merger Mi and is expressed as
:
WTSMiout(Ki,Kj , Z) = piout(Ki − 1,Kj , Z + 1) ∗ nbr of firms bought (5)
The selling price of an outsider firm depends on the number of firms the
two owners want to buy. More precisely, when the outsider sets its selling
price, he forestalls his profit in the last stage if it declines the offer consider-
ing all the other firms the owner wants to buy have accepted and considering
that the owner which buy others can close some of them after.
lemma 3.
• Mergers M1 and M2 buy all the outside firms so as to get : K1+K2=16
(Z=0).
• Since K1+K2=16 only market structures wherein one owner lets all
his firms active and the other closes some of his firms can occur.
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However, these structures are not Nash equilibria because the owners of
M1 and M2 can benefit from purchasing themselves.
Facing K2, we compute the willingness to pay of M1 to purchase M2 in its
entirety.
WTP 2
nd
M1
(K1,K2, 0) = piM1(16, 0, 0)− piM1(K1,K2, 0) (6)
whereWTP 2
nd
M1
(K1,K2, 0) is the willingness to pay ofM1 and piM1(K1,K2, 0)
designs the duopoly profit of M1.
M2 is willing to sell its merger at any price above its profit : piM2(K1,K2, 0).
M1 will purchase M2 if :
WTP 2
nd
M1
(K1,K2, 0) > piM2(K1,K2, 0) (7)
We compute this for all the different values of K2 (with K1 +K2 = 16) and
we obtain the following proposition :
proposition 3. Monopolization of the industry:
• At equilibrium, only monopolization of the industry can occur.
• The only possible equilibria in this game consist of unmerged equilibria
wherein one owner possessing all firms will let all of them active.
Proof. The first part is obtained by numerical simulations. The second is
straightforward by considering : ∂pi
M1
∂k1
(16, 0, 0) > 0⇒ k∗1 = K1.
3.2 Direct monopolization
In this section, we exhibit a second trajectory in which only firm M1 makes
bids in order to purchase other firms. The game is solved as previously.
proposition 4.
• The merger M1 will buy all the outside firms so as to monopolize the
market.
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• If the market results in a monopolization, then the owner will let active
all his firms.
The first part of the proposition is verified comparing the willingness to
pay of M1 with the willingness to sell of all the outside firms. Proof of the
second part is the same than for the previous proposition.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have considered the possibility of monopolization through acquisition in
an industry composed initially of a high number of firms. We have modeled
this in a three-stage game. In this model, firms compete in price in a dif-
ferentiated product industry. Moreover, we assume that firms belonging to
the same owner act cooperatively.
Our main conclusion is that, in contrast to the results obtained by
Kamien and Zang (1990), merged equilibria can appear in this game. More-
over monopolization of the industry occurs with a high number of firms.
Our model can be extended to the case of coalitions structures in which
a coalition, maximizing its joint payoff given the outside choice, decides the
number of active firms which compete, but the other firms are not closed,
they still exist but not compete (for example, they receive an allowance from
the active firms).
Acknowledgements :
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Appendix A. Proof of lemma 1
The maximisation program of a merger M1 with k1 active firms is :
max
p
M1
1
,p
M1
2
,...,p
M1
k1
(piM1) (8)
where
pi
M1 =
k1∑
i=1
(pM1i − c)
1
1 + γ(k1 + k2 + Z − 1)
∗ (9)

1− 1 + γ(k1 + k2 + Z − 2)
1− γ
p
M1
i +
γ
1− γ
(
∑
i6=j
p
M1
j +
∑
j∈M2
pj +
∑
j∈out
pj


We design by j ∈ out the firms which are outsiders.
We obtain k1 First Order Conditions (FOC) which are symmetric, so p
M1
i =
pM1 ,∀i ∈M1. After simplifications, we obtain the best response functions:
pM1(p−M1) =
1− γ + γ
∑
i/∈M1
(pi)
2[1 + γ(k2 + Z − 1)]
+
c
2
(10)
The best-reply function is symmetric for the merger M2.
The maximisation program of an outside firm is:
max
pi
(pi − c)
1
1 + γ(
∑2
i=1 ki + Z − 1)
∗ (11)

1− 1 + γ(
∑2
i=1 ki + Z − 2)
1− γ
pi +
γ
1− γ
(
∑
j∈M1
pj +
∑
j∈M2
pj +
∑
j 6=iandj∈out
pj)]


As before, prices of outsiders are equal, we then replace, p∗i by p
out for all i /∈
(M1,M2). We obtain :
pout(p−out) =
1− γ + γ(
∑
j∈M1
pj +
∑
j∈M2
pj + c[1 + γ(
∑2
i=1 ki + Z − 2)]
2[1 + γ(
∑2
i=1 ki + Z − 2)]− γ(Z − 1)
(12)
In order to simplify, we replace
(pM1(p−M1), pM2(p−M2), pout(p−out)) (13)
by
(p1, p2, p). (14)
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The intersection of best response functions yields to :


p∗1=
(1−γ)+γ(k2p2+Zp)
2[1+γ(k2+Z−1)]
p∗2=
(1−γ)+γ(k1p1+Zp)
2[1+γ(k1+Z−1)]
p∗= (1−γ)+γ(k1p1+k2p2)2[1+γ(k1+k2+Z−2)]−γ(Z−1)
Appendix B. Proof of proposition 2
Numerical simulations give the number of active firms in the merger M2 in
order having k∗1 < K1.
γ =0.5 γ =0.9
Z= k2 ≥ k2 ≥
0 11 1
1 17 8
2 23 14
3 30 20
4 36 26
5 42 33
We read this table like this for example:”for Z=3 and γ = 0.9, k2 must be
higher than 20 to piM1 have an interior maximum (k∗1 < K1)”.
Note that for γ =0.1, k2 must be very high to merger M1 have a maximum.
Appendix C. Tables
Table 1
Reaction functions of the two mergers for Z = 1:
13
K1 K2 k1 k2 pi
M1 piM2
1 14 1 14 0.004226 0.024267
2 13 2 13 0.004656 0.016495
3 12 2.19 12 0.004818 0.015507
4 11 2.36 11 0.005013 0.014701
5 10 2.61 10 0.005255 0.013668
6 9 3.02 9 0.005562 0.012277
7 8 3.8 8 0.005965 0.010335
8 7 8 3.8 0.010335 0.005965
9 6 9 3.02 0.012277 0.005562
10 5 10 2.61 0.013668 0.005255
11 4 11 2.36 0.014701 0.005013
12 3 12 2.19 0.015507 0.004818
13 2 13 2 0.016495 0.004656
14 1 14 1 0.024267 0.004226
Table 2
Reaction functions of the two mergers for Z = 0:
K1 K2 k1 k2 k1 k2
1 15 ⊘ ⊘ 0.156969 15
2 14 2 0.247657 0.157632 14
3 13 3 0.203337 0.158403 13
4 12 4 0.186461 0.159311 12
5 11 5 0.177512 0.160394 11
6 10 6 0.171958 0.161711 10
7 9 7 0.168174 0.163346 9
8 8 8 0.165428 0.165428 8
9 7 9 0.163346 0.168174 7
10 6 10 0.161711 0.171958 6
11 5 11 0.160394 0.177512 5
12 4 12 0.159311 0.186461 4
13 3 13 0.158403 0.203337 3
14 2 14 0.157632 0.247657 2
15 1 15 0.156969 ⊘ ⊘
For Z = 0 and Ki > 1,∀i = 1, 2, two cases are possible for each structure
(K1,K2).
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Table 3
Best-response functions (k∗1(K1,Z)):
Z=0 Z=1 Z=2 Z=3 Z=4 Z=5 Z=6 Z=7 Z=8
K1 k1= k1= k1= k1= k1= k1= k1= k1= k1=
1 0.156969 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 (0.157632;2) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 (0.158403;3) 2.19 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 (0.159311;4) 2.36 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 (0.160394;5) 2.61 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
6 (0.161711;6) 3.02 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
7 (0.163346;7) 3.8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
8 (0.165428;8) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ⊘
9 (0.168174;9) 9 9 9 9 9 9 ⊘ ⊘
10 (0.171958;10) 10 10 10 10 10 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
11 (0.177512;11) 11 11 11 11 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
12 (0.186461;12) 12 12 12 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
13 (0.203337;13) 13 13 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
14 (0.247657;14) 14 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
15 15 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
Z=9 Z=10 Z=11 Z=12 Z=13 Z=14
K1 k1= k1= k1= k1= k1= k1=
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 ⊘
3 3 3 3 3 ⊘ ⊘
4 4 4 4 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
5 5 5 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
6 6 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
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Table 4
Profit of the mergerM1 function of the number of outsider firms (Z) and the number
of firms owned by the merger (K1):
K1= Z=0 Z=1 Z=2 Z=3
1 0.024136 0.004226 0.00229277 0.00153169
2 (0.0242078,0.11683) 0.004656 0.00310011 0.00232071
3 (0.0242909,0.132968) 0.004818 0.00355813 0.00286077
4 (0.0243881,0.140544) 0.00393371 0.00332096 0.00291471
5 (0.0245034,0.144974) 0.005255 0.00431892 0.00377761
6 (0.0246423,0.147886) 0.005562 0.00476051 0.00427738
7 (0.024813,0.149947) 0.005965 0.00529569 0.00486037
8 (0.0250277,0.151484) 0.010335 0.0059674 0.00557287
9 (0.025306,0.152673) 0.012277 0.00683702 0.00647999
10 (0.025681,0.153622) 0.013668 0.00800361 0.0076859
11 (0.0262137,0.154396) 0.014701 0.00964303 0.00937582
12 (0.0270303,0.155039) 0.015507 0.0121038 0.0119203
13 (0.0284404,0.155582) 0.016495 0.0161899 ⊘
14 (0.0314653,0.156048) 0.024267 ⊘ ⊘
15 0.15645 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
K1= Z=4 Z=5 Z=6 Z=7 Z=8
1 0.00114897 0.000927698 0.000743159 0.000694726 0.000630024
2 0.00187127 0.0015811 0.00139909 0.00126817 0.00117559
3 0.00242304 0.00213159 0.00193009 0.00178781 0.00168679
4 0.00291471 0.00263468 0.00243739 0.00229754 0.00219966
5 0.00340615 0.00314529 0.00296083 0.00283193 0.00274541
6 0.00393964 0.00370162 0.00353569 0.00342451 0.00335683
7 0.00455497 0.0043428 0.00420094 0.00411473 0.00407466
8 0.0053 0.00511814 0.00500784 0.00495664 ⊘
9 0.00624307 0.00609978 0.0060336 ⊘ ⊘
10 0.00749451 0.00740599 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
11 0.00925262 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
K1= Z=9 Z=10 Z=11 Z=12 Z=13
1 0.000584244 0.000551693 0.000528856 0.000513482 0.000504097
2 0.0011098 0.00106365 0.0010326 0.00101364 0.00100481
3 0.00161599 0.00156837 0.00153931 0.00152578 ⊘
4 0.00213386 0.00209374 0.00207506 ⊘ ⊘
5 0.00269268 0.00266814 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
6 0.00332535 ⊘ ⊘ ⊘ ⊘
K1= Z=14
1 0.000499723
where for Z = 0, the first number designs the profit of the merger M1 when
16
k∗1 < K1 and k
∗
2 = K2 and for the second number it is the inverse.
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